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The United Nations Security Council’s Legislative and Enforcement 
Powers and Climate Change 
Alan Boyle*, Jacques Hartmann**, and Annalisa Savaresi*** 
Abstract: 
Since the adoption of the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
international climate change law-making has chiefly been the prerogative of the treaty bodies 
established under the Convention and its Protocol. The adoption of the Paris Agreement in 
December 2015 is an important step forward for the multilateral climate change framework, 
but, despite its rapid entry into force, it is still too early to tell whether the Paris Agreement 
will prove to be an effective and successful intergovernmental framework for tackling 
climate change. Nor is it necessarily the only relevant institution in the climate change 
regime.  Given the urgency of climate change and the glacial pace of multilateral climate 
law-making, the idea of exploiting the United Nations Security Council’s legislative and 
enforcement powers to lead global efforts on climate change therefore holds a significant 
appeal. This chapter focuses on the use of the Council’s legislative and enforcement powers 
to help states get out of the climate change law-making quagmire. Firstly, the chapter 
analyses the powers and practice of the Council both as a global legislator, and in enforcing 
states’ obligations. Secondly, the chapter considers how existing Council law-making and 
enforcement powers can be applied to climate change. The chapter concludes by reflecting on 
advantages and disadvantages of Council’s legislative and enforcement action in relation to 
climate change. 
1. Introduction
Since the adoption of the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
international climate change law-making has chiefly been the prerogative of the treaty bodies 
established under the Convention and its Protocol. While this is hardly unique to the climate 
regime – and rather is a recurrent feature of multilateral environmental agreements1 – 
international climate change law-making is truly remarkable for its latitude, as well as for the 
limited results it has delivered. Over twenty years the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the 
UNFCCC, its subsidiary bodies and their homologues under the Kyoto Protocol have adopted 
hundreds of decisions and established dozens of institutions, which together constitute one of 
the largest international environmental bureaucracies in existence. Yet, these remarkably 
intense law- and institution-making activities have made limited progress in achieving the 
objective of the UNFCCC, namely, the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
* Professor in International Law, University of Edinburgh, School of Law.
** Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Dundee, School of Law. 
*** Lecturer in Environmental Law, University of Stirling, School of Law. Please address all comments and 
queries to: annalisa.savaresi@stir.ac.uk. 
1 As observed e.g. in G Churchill and G Ulfstein, ‘Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law’ (2000) 94 The American 
Journal of International Law 623; and AE Boyle and CM Chinkin, The Making of International Law (Oxford 
University Press 2007) 151. 
This is a draft chapter/article that has been accepted for publication by Edward Elgar 
Publishing in the forthcoming book Climate Change and the UN Security Council due to 
be published in 2017
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atmosphere at a level that would prevent ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system.’2 
 
The quest for means to achieve this objective has recently led to the adoption of a new 
climate treaty, the 2015 Paris Agreement.3 The agreement does not dismantle the pre-existing 
international climate change law architecture, but rather builds upon it, with the specific aim 
to further enhance the implementation of the UNFCCC.4 The agreement has made some 
strides in identifying a common goal to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions ‘as 
soon as possible’ and to keep ‘global temperature increases below 2°C’.5 However, the Paris 
Agreement leaves ample leeway to Parties on how to achieve this goal, largely imposing 
upon them obligations of conduct, rather than obligations of result.6 Furthermore, much of 
the detail concerning Parties’ obligations remains to be determined by the climate regime’s 
subsidiary bodies.7  
 
In a process that now counts 197 Parties, these law-making activities have historically been 
difficult.8 Given the highly technical nature of the challenge at hand, and the gaping disparity 
in states’ capacity to rise to the task, it was hardly surprising that it took several years to 
negotiate rules for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. Even when these were agreed, 
states struggled to ratify the treaty, whose 2012 amendment concerning emission reduction 
targets for the period between 2013-2020 is yet to enter into force.9 Therefore, the challenge 
is not only to secure the adoption of technical rules enabling the implementation of a treaty, 
but also to ensure that political will supporting its adoption is not squandered in the process.  
 
At the time of writing it looks like the ratification of the Paris Agreement will be a swift 
affair, with the world’s largest emitters, China and the US, already on-board.10 Ensuring that 
the largely procedural obligations enshrined in the agreement are interpreted and 
implemented in a way that ensures the achievement of the 2°C goal, however, is likely to be a 
much greater hurdle. The adoption of the Paris Agreement is in this connection just the 
beginning of a new and predictably lengthy regulatory phase, whereby Parties will interpret 
and give content to its broadly worded obligations,11 adjusting the existing institutional 
framework to best serve a new international climate governance architecture. This task is no 
mean undertaking in a process operating on the basis of consensus, which typically leads to 
lowest common denominator outcomes12 and institutional ‘viscosity’.13 Even though 
                                                
2 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article 2. 
3 Paris Agreement, Paris, 12 December 2015, not yet in force. 
4 Paris Agreement, Article 2.1. This section draws upon reflections in: A Savaresi ‘The Paris Agreement: 
Reflections on an International Law Odyssey’ presented at the 12th Annual Conference of the European Society 
of International Law, ‘How International Law Works in Times of Crisis’ Riga, 8-10 September 2016. 
5 Paris Agreement, Article 2.1(a). 
6 Paris Agreement, Article 4.2. 
7 As detailed in Decision 1/CP.21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, (UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10, Add.1, 29 
January 2016), at 26, 28, 31, 34, 92-95 and 100-102 for the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement; 
and 29, 34, 37, 39-41, 58, 68, 76-77 and 101 for the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and the Subsidiary 
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice. 
8 As suggested also in Boyle and Chinkin (n 1) 159. 
9 Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, December 2012, not yet in force. 
10  An up-to-date list of Parties may be accessed at: 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-
d&chapter=27&clang=_en>. 
11 As suggested also in A Savaresi, ‘The Paris Agreement: A New Beginning?’ (2016) 34 Journal of Energy and 
Natural Resources Law 1. 
12 As suggested in Boyle and Chinkin (n 1) 159. 
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prolonged law-making is standard practice in the implementation of multilateral 
environmental agreements, the path ahead for Parties to the climate regime is laden with 
difficulties, which may well erode the political capital on which the Paris Agreement is built.  
 
Another element that remains to be assessed after the adoption of the Paris Agreement is the 
of role non-state actors in international climate change governance. Greenhouse gas 
emissions are largely the product of non-state actors, rather than states. By their very nature, 
however, international law obligations do not typically target non-state actors, but rather 
place on states the burden of regulating non-state actors’ activities. Neither do non-state 
actors formally participate in international climate law-making. As under other multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs), non-state actors may attend meetings of the Parties 
without voting,14 but cannot formally participate in international law-making. Non-state 
actors activities have nevertheless gained increasing visibility in the climate regime in recent 
years.15  
 
In the lead up to the adoption of the Paris Agreement, unprecedented initiatives showcased 
and promoted voluntary emission reductions by companies and subnational governments.16 
The preamble of the Paris Agreement builds upon these initiatives, recognizing for the first 
time in a climate treaty the importance of engaging ‘all levels of government’ and ‘various 
actors’ in addressing climate change.17 Furthermore, while the UNFCCC already made 
generic reference to public participation in addressing climate change and its effects and 
developing adequate responses,18 the Paris Agreement specifically emphasizes enhanced 
public and private sector participation in the implementation of Parties’ nationally determined 
contributions (NDCs).19  These recent developments largely focus on non-state actors’ 
engagement in the making and implementation of climate change action at the national, 
rather than at the international level. Yet, implementation of the Paris Agreement may open 
the door to new avenues for non-state actors involvement in international climate change 
governance, for example enabling their participation in the review of implementation of 
Parties’ implementation of their obligations.20 Furthermore, implementation of the Paris 
Agreement may lead to new ways to monitor and scrutinize non-state actors transnational 
activities, building on experience accrued with voluntary initiatives such as that of the UN 
Global Compact for sustainability.21 
 
It is nevertheless too early to tell whether the Paris Agreement will prove to be an effective 
and successful intergovernmental framework for tackling climate change. Given the urgency 
of climate change and the glacial pace of multilateral climate law-making, the idea of 
                                                                                                                                                  
13 On the notion of viscosity, see DW Drezner, ‘The Viscosity of Global Governance: When Is Forum-Shopping 
Expensive’ (2006) <https://www.princeton.edu/~pcglobal/conferences/IPES/papers/drezner_S1100_16.pdf> 
accessed 11 October 2016. 
14 UNFCCC, Article 7.6 and, Kyoto Protocol, Article 13.8. 
15  See e.g. S Chan et al., ‘Reinvigorating International Climate Policy: A Comprehensive Framework for 
Effective Non-state Action’ (2015) 6:4 Global Policy 466; and S Chan et al., ‘Strengthening Non-state Climate 
Action: A Progress Assessment of Commitments Launched at the 2014 UN Climate Summit’ (London School 
of Economics, 2015).  
16 See Lima-Paris Action Agenda and the Non-state Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA) platform, both 
launched in 2014. 
17 Paris Agreement, Preamble. 
18 UNFCCC, Article 6 
19 Paris Agreement, Article 6.8. 
20 As suggested in H van Asselt, ‘The Role of Non-State Actors in Reviewing Ambition, Implementation, and 
Compliance under the Paris Agreement’ (2016) 6 Climate Law 91, 96. 
21 See <https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc>. 
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exploiting the United Nations Security Council’s (Council) legislative and enforcement 
powers to lead global efforts on climate change therefore retains its appeal, even after the 
adoption of the Paris Agreement.22 The attraction of the Council’s involvement chiefly lies in 
its ability to produce quick, universal and immediately binding obligations upon all 193 UN 
member states.23 The use of the Council’s powers to impose sanctions and the use of force 
will be discussed in other chapters in this collection.24 This chapter instead focuses on the use 
of the Council’s legislative and enforcement powers to help states get out of the climate 
change law-making quagmire. Firstly, the chapter analyses the powers and practice of the 
Council both as a global legislator, and in enforcing states’ obligations. Secondly, the chapter 
considers how existing Council law-making and enforcement powers can be applied to 
climate change. The chapter concludes by reflecting on advantages and disadvantages of 
Council’s legislative and enforcement action in relation to climate change.  
 
2. International law-making and the Council 
 
International law is made largely on a decentralised basis by disparate lawmakers, which 
typically attend to this task in an ad hoc fashion, addressing matters that require the adoption 
of internationally coordinated solutions. In this decentralised system different law-making 
processes may be engaged simultaneously or in competition with each other.25 This 
complexity can often make it difficult to disentangle the various parts of the law-making 
process and to ascertain the content of the law. The climate regime is a case in point. Over 
the years, the sheer complexity of the law-making machinery established to reach the 
objective of the UNFCCC and assist with its implementation has engendered an almost 
impenetrable maze of norms, which are remarkably fragmented, not only in their scope, but 
also in terms of their legal value and force.26  
 
When compared with the limited results delivered by the international climate law-making 
process, the Council offers unique advantages of speed and universality. The UN Charter 
entrusts the Council with the primary responsibility for the ‘maintenance of international 
peace and security’27 and all UN member states have agreed ‘to accept and carry out’ its 
decisions.28 The Council’s decisions are ex se legally binding upon UN members, and will 
prevail over any inconsistent obligations in accordance with Article 103.29  
 
The so-called legislative powers of the Council emanate from Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
which enables it to take various forms of non-military or military action where necessary. 
Pursuant to Article 39 the Council must first determine whether a ‘threat to the peace, a 
                                                
22 See the chapter by S Scott and C Ku in this volume. 
23 Boyle and Chinkin (n 1) 113. 
24 See chapters by C Penny and F Sindico, respectively, in this volume. 
25 Boyle and Chinkin (n 1) 25. 
26  Churchill and Ulfstein (n 1). 635; D French and L Rajamani, ‘Climate Change and International 
Environmental Law: Musings on a Journey to Somewhere’ (2013) 25 Journal of Environmental Law 437, 445; 
and H van Asselt, The Fragmentation of Global Climate Governance: Consequences and Management of 
Regime Interactions (Edward Elgar Publishing 2014).  
27 UN Charter, Article 24. 
28 UN Charter, Article 25. 
29. Lockerbie Cases (Provisional Measures) 1992 ICJ Reports 114, para 42. See commentary on Article 103 B 
Simma and others (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Third edition, Oxford University 
Press 2012) 2209. 
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breach of the peace, or an act of aggression’ exists. This requirement is typically satisfied by 
a reference in the text of the resolution to a ‘threat to the peace,’ or a similar formula.30 
 
Whenever threats to the peace exist, the Council has the power to impose obligations on UN 
member states, in a way that far exceeds the powers of any other international body. In the 
exercise of this power, the Council has rewritten or dispensed with existing international law 
and even overridden other law-making processes, acting de facto as a global legislator. So 
even though the Council has no express power to legislate, and it is doubtful whether the 
drafters of the UN Charter intended it to have such a role,31 it has over years passed a number 
of resolutions creating new law. 
 
Although Council resolutions do not fit within the traditional definition of the sources of 
international law under Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, there is 
no doubt that states treat resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as 
‘normative in their relations with each other.’32 Indeed, some Council resolutions have 
created far-reaching obligations of a general nature that are binding on all members of the 
UN.  
 
The capacity of the Council to override treaties and general international law and create new 
obligations for UN member states without them ratifying new treaties, amending existing 
treaties, or creating new rules of customary international law must be regarded as a formal 
legislative capacity.33 For the purposes of present chapter, the term ‘legislative decisions’ is 
therefore used to refer to resolutions that lay down rules of a general nature creating new 
international obligations and that are binding upon all UN member states. 
 
The practice of the Council provides two prominent examples of such legislative decisions.34 
After the events of 11 September 2001 (9/11) the Council passed two unprecedented 
resolutions on terrorist financing and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 
Resolution 1373 was adopted less than two weeks after the events of 9/11 and broke new 
ground by creating far-reaching obligations concerning counter-terrorism, to be implemented 
both in domestic legal orders as well as in cooperation between states.35 Resolution 1540 was 
adopted in 2004,36 and was aimed at addressing the specific concern that terrorists might 
acquire WMD, such as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.37 A long series of Council 
resolutions built upon this initial basis to further state obligations concerning counter-
terrorism.38 Resolutions 1373 and 1540 are analysed in detail below (sections 3 and 4). 
                                                
30  Simma and others (eds), ibid. 
31 H Waldock, ‘General Course on Public International Law’ Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of 
International Law, vol 106 (Brill 1962) 25.  
32 R Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Clarendon Press 1995) 18. 
33 Boyle and Chinkin (n 1) 233. 
34 Other possible examples of law making resolutions include the establishment of the ad hoc Tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia by (Resolution 827 (25 May 1993)) and Rwanda (Resolution 995 (8 November 1994)) as 
well as the two resolutions which exempted US soldiers from the jurisdiction of the ICC (Resolution 1422 (12 
July (2002) and 1487 (12 June 2003)). 
35 Security Council Resolutions 1373 (28 September 2001). 
36 Security Council Resolution 1540 (28 April 2004). 
37 See e.g. A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change (United Nations, 2004) 43, para. 135. 
38 Prominent among these are Resolution 1624 (14 September 2005) on the prohibition of incitement to commit 
terrorist acts and Resolution 2178 (24 September 2014) concerning foreign fighters. For an overview of 
resolutions, see <http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/resources/res-sc.html>.  
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Before moving on to the consideration of these resolutions, it is however necessary to reflect 
on the limits to the law-making powers of the Council.  
2.1. Limits to the Council’s powers  
The exercise of legislative powers by the Council is potentially problematic.39 Pushed too far, 
its legislative activities may lose support and lead to challenges to their validity.40 Thus the 
Council’s role as a global legislator is tenable only if its use of powers is regarded as a 
legitimate by most UN member states.41 In this regard, substantial limits on the Council’s 
powers under Chapter VII are of the essence. Two obvious limitations are suggested by the 
wording of the Charter itself.  
 
Firstly, Article 24 provides that in carrying out its duties the Council ‘shall act in accordance 
with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.’42 The purposes and principles are 
enshrined in Articles 1 and 2 of the UN Charter, respectively, and include the prohibition of 
the use of force, as well the achievement of international cooperation in solving international 
problems, and the development of friendly relationship amongst nations. These grounds are, 
however, rather broad and unlikely to exert constraints on the exercise of the Council’s 
powers under Chapter VII.  
 
The Council has interpreted the concept of ‘threat to the peace’ with a certain largesse.43 
Article 39 attributes to the Security Council itself the power to determine ‘the existence of 
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’. This provision has been the 
subject of great scholarly debate,44 which broadly interprets it in one of two ways. Some 
authors suggest that Article 39 merely establishes a procedural obligation, whereas others 
read it as a substantial requirement. According to the first, the exercise of Chapter VII powers 
merely requires the Council to determine that a threat to the peace exists and assessment of 
what constitutes such a threat lies completely within the Council’s discretion.45 In contrast, 
                                                
39 See M Happold, ‘Security Council Resolution 1373 and the Constitution of the United Nations’ (2003) 16 
Leiden Journal of International Law 593, 593; Daniel H Joyner, ‘Non-Proliferation Law and the United Nations 
System: Resolution 1540 and the Limits of the Power of the Council’ (2007) 20 Leiden Journal of International 
Law 489, 518. 
40 See DD Caron, ‘The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council’ (1993) 87 The American 
Journal of International Law 552, 552 ; PC Szasz, ‘The Security Council Starts Legislating’ (2002) 96 The 
American Journal of International Law 901, 901. 
41 On the issue of legitimacy, see Scott and Ku (n 21) 10-12. 
42 See ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, IT-94-1-AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision, 2 October 1995, 
paras 28-29. 
43 See e.g. V Gowlland-Debbas, ‘The Security Council as Enforcer of Human Rights’ in B Fassbender (ed), 
Securing Human Rights?Achievements and Challenges of the UN Security Council (Oxford University Press 
2011) 40 and Cortright et al., ‘The Sanctions Era : Themes and Trends in UN Security Council Sanctions since 
1990’, in V. Lowe et al. (eds), The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and 
Practice since 1945 (2007) 205. 
44 The literature on this issue is copious. See among others TM Franck, ‘The “Powers of Appreciation”: Who Is 
the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?’ (1992) American Journal of International Law 519; V Gowlland-
Debbas, ‘The Relationship Between the International Court of Justice and the Council in the Light of the 
Lockerbie Case’ (1994) American Journal of International Law 643; JE Alvarez, ‘Judging the Council’ (1996) 
American Journal of International Law 1; D Akande, ‘The International Court of Justice and the Council: Is 
There Room for Judicial Control of Decisions of the Political Organs of the United Nations?’ (1997) 46 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 309. 
45 See e.g. H Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems (The 
Lawbook Exchange, Ltd 1950) 727; P Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (7th 
edn, Routledge 1997) 427; David Schweigman, The Authority of the Security Council Under Chapter Vii of the 
Un Charter: Legal Limits and the Role of the International Court of Justice (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2001) 
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the second group insists that criteria to objectively identify a threat to the peace actually exist, 
such as, for example, actual fighting on the ground.46 In practice, it may be argued, the only 
real limit to adopting a Chapter VII resolution is that of acquiring the requisite votes.47 Yet, 
several states have noted that resorting to Chapter VII as an umbrella for addressing issues 
that do not pose a threat to international peace and security must be avoided.48 
 
Another limitation may come from ius cogens. Some of the Council’s resolutions relating to 
the war in Bosnia, for example, have been challenged on the basis that they facilitated 
genocide, by denying Bosnia the right to self-defence.49 This argument would seem to 
support the conclusion that Council resolutions cannot authorise torture, genocide, war 
crimes, or any other activity falling within the narrow category of ius cogens.50  
 
Whether the Council’s exercise of Chapter VII powers generally has to comply with 
international law has also been the subject of much debate. In his classic work on the UN, 
Kelsen concludes that the Charter does not provide that in order to be enforceable decisions 
‘must be in conformity with the law which exists at the time they are adopted.’51 
Controversially, this is the case even in relation to international human rights law. In this 
regard Cassese observes:  
 
Under the UN Charter system, as complemented by the international standards which have emerged in the 
last fifty years, respect for human rights and self-determination of peoples, however important and crucial 
it may be, is never allowed to put peace in jeopardy. One may dislike this state of affairs, but so it is under 
lex lata.52 
 
This approach has been criticised in the literature,53 but not in the practice of international 
and regional courts and tribunals. Indeed, so far international judicial bodies have tended to 
treat Chapter VII resolutions as presumptively valid.54 The approach by the European Court 
of Justice in the Kadi cases is revealing. While the EU Court of First Instance showed some 
willingness to review Resolution 137355 in light of ius cogens norms, the Grand Chamber 
went to great lengths to emphasise that it was not reviewing the legality of the said 
                                                                                                                                                  
34; ND White and C Henderson (eds), Research Handbook on International Conflict and Security Law: Jus Ad 
Bellum, Jus in Bello and Jus Post Bellum (Edward Elgar 2013) 124. 
46 See e.g. A Tzanakopoulos, Disobeying the Security Council: Countermeasures against Wrongful Sanctions 
(Oxford University Press 2013) 61–62. 
47 Scott and Ku (n 21) 9. 
48 President’s Summary, High-Level Thematic Debate of the General Assembly ‘Maintenance of International 
Peace and Security’ (1 October 2015). In relation to climate change, see Scott and Ku (21) 7-8. 
49 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, (Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment) [1996], ICJ Rep 595, especially the Separate Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht.  
50 A Boyle, ‘International Lawmaking: Towards a New Role for the Security Council?’ in A Cassese (ed), 
Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 183. 
51 H Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems (The Lawbook 
Exchange, 1950) 294–295. 
52  A Cassese, ‘Ex Iniuria Ius Oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible 
Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?’ (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 
23, 25. 
53 SAG Talmon, ‘Council Treaty Action’ (2009) 62 Revue Hellénique de Droit International 65, 68. 
54 See e.g. Legal Consequences for states of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 16, para 
20; Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić (n 42), para. 29. 
55 Security Council Resolution 1373 (28 September 2001). Discussed in section 3.1.1. 
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Resolution.56 Instead, the Grand Chamber emphasised that its review only concerned the 
lawfulness of implementing EU regulations in light of ‘fundamental rights as protected by the 
Community legal order’.57 The European Court of Human Right has been equally careful, 
relying on the presumption that ‘the Council does not intend to impose any obligation on 
member states to breach fundamental principles of human rights.’58 Nevertheless, in future 
the legality of a resolution could well be challenged on the ground that it exceeds the 
Council’s competence ratione materiae, for example, because a specific measure is not seen 
as a means ‘to maintain or restore’ international peace and security. 59 
 
Yet, the analysis of practice to date seems to suggest that, in spite of the objections raised in 
the literature, there seems to be few constraints to the legislative action of the Council, except 
perhaps from those flowing from the Charter itself. This conclusion seems to be also the most 
practical: if the Council is bound to act within existing international law, then its power to act 
could be severely compromised and open to challenge in most, if not all cases. On that basis 
the Council would find itself constantly embroiled in endless argument about the legality of 
its decisions, with serious consequences for its effectiveness.60 This would deprive the 
Council of its raison d’être as a body that can promptly respond to issues of international 
peace and security.  
 
3. The Council’s legislative powers in practice  
 
There are several ways in which the Council may lay down rules of a general nature 
applicable to all UN member states and thus create new international obligations. For the 
purpose of this chapter, legislative decisions are divided into two typologies. The first 
concerns the creation of new international obligations without states ratifying treaties or 
creating new rules of customary international law. This typology may include the extension 
of obligations embedded in existing international treaties to non-Parties. The second typology 
concerns the alteration of existing international obligations, such as obligations in treaties or 
general international law. This might include a broadening of the scope or content of treaty 
provisions without following established amendment procedures. In practice, the distinction 
between the creation of new international obligations and alteration existing international 
obligations is not always clear-cut or useful. For the purposes of the present analysis, 
however, the distinction is useful as it enables us to distinguish between different types of 
legislative action that the Council may take, and to reflect on how these may apply in the case 
of climate change. 
 
3.1. The imposition of new international obligations  
 
Resolutions 1373 and 1540 imposed new obligations on UN member states. Resolution 1373 
obliged UN member states to take action to enhance their legal and institutional ability to 
counter terrorism activities, including by criminalising the financing of terrorism; freezing 
and denying all forms of financial support to terrorist groups; sharing information and 
cooperating in the investigation of such acts. In addition, the Council also used its powers 
                                                
56 Kadi v Council and Commission, T-315/01 (Judgment of 21 September 2005) para. 226. 
57 Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C-402/05 P (Judgment of 3 
September 2008) paras 221-225 and 283. 
58 Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom, Appl. no. 27021/08 (Judgement of 7 July 2011) para 102. 
59 UN Charter, Article 39. 
60 Boyle (n 53) 185.  
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under Chapter VII to target named individuals and other non-state entities.61 It did so by 
requiring states to impose financial, travel, and arms sanctions on individuals and entities 
listed by the Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee, which had been established in 1999.62  
 
Many of the above-mentioned obligations directly or indirectly concern non-state actors. Yet, 
as observed also in relation to climate change law, international law obligations do not 
generally target non-state actors ex se, but rather place on states the burden to regulate non-
state actors’ activities, for instance by freezing their assets or by proscribing new kinds of 
conduct in domestic law. As the Council has no means to directly enforce its resolutions,63 it 
has to rely on the cooperation of states and on their implementation of international 
obligations in domestic law. So even Council-made obligations are not self-executing and do 
require state implementation. And even though technically it was Resolution 1373 that 
provided the normative basis for a new counter-terrorism regime, the implementation of this 
new regime relied upon states to ensure implementation in domestic law.  
 
What is different and special about the counter-terrorism regime established by Resolution 
1373 is that earlier international counter-terrorism cooperation was largely the result of 
obligations that were typically adopted by treaty. Indeed, numerous obligations imposed by 
Resolution 1373 are modelled on provisions included in a long list of existing counter-
terrorism treaties, and most saliently in the 1999 International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorist (Financing Convention). Resolution 1373, 
however, unprecedentedly rendered numerous provisions in the Financing Convention legally 
binding on all UN member states, at a time when the Convention still needed 18 ratifications 
to enter into force.64 Resolution 1373 merely called on, but did not require, states to become 
parties to international counter-terrorism instruments ‘as soon as possible’. Thus the 
resolution imposed new obligations upon states, building on the basis of a treaty that had not 
yet entered into force, and which had only been ratified by four states. 
 
The importance of Resolution 1373 can thus hardly be overestimated. Before 9/11 
international counter-terrorism efforts were characterised by the fact that states were free to 
decide whether to partake or not, by ratifying the relevant treaties. Resolution 1373 de facto 
deprived UN member states of this choice and created a mandatory and virtually universal 
counter-terrorism regime. Not only was the new regime mandatory, but it also took priority 
over other treaty obligations, by virtue of Article 103 of the UN Charter. None of the 
obligations in Resolution 1373 were, moreover, confined to acts related to the events of 9/11. 
On the contrary, the resolution targeted all acts of ‘terrorism’ - a concept that was left 
                                                
61  The power of the Council to make demands or create obligations for non-state actors was explicitly 
acknowledged by the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on Kosovo: see Accordance with International Law of the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo (Advisory Opinion) [2010] ICJ Rep 403, paras. 
116-117. 
62 Following the Taliban regime’s refusal to surrender Usama Bin Laden in 1999 the Council passed Resolution 
1267, which obliged UN member states to adopt various measures against the Taliban regime, including the 
freezing of funds. The Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee was set up to monitor implementation and was 
mandated to consider instances of non-compliance, recommend appropriate action and make periodic reports on 
the impact of the measures imposed. Resolution 1267 (15 October 1999). 
63 Pursuant to Article 43 of the UN Charter member states undertake to make armed forces available to the 
Council, but the provision has never been implemented. Simma and others (n 33) 1351–1356. 
64 See International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Article 23.1. At the time, 
only four states had ratified: Botswana (8 September 2000); Sri Lanka (8 September 2000); The United 
Kingdom (7 March 2001); and Uzbekistan (9 July 2001). 
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undefined - 65 and it did so without any express time limitation. In fact, Resolution 1373 is 
still in force, more than a decade after its adoption.  
 
Despite its extensive scope and far-reaching obligations, Resolution 1373 was passed 
unanimously without any debate or objections.66 As Wood notes, ‘no state has seriously 
suggested that… [it] was not lawfully adopted’.67 While many recognised the innovative 
character of the resolution, no one seemed concerned that the Council was in effect acting as 
a global legislator creating new international obligations, without any direct expression of 
state consent.68 Similarly to Resolution 1373, Resolution 1540 also created new obligations 
for a large number of states. It did so by extending obligations embedded in existing WMD 
regime to non-parties, and, by altering the obligations of existing Parties, as the next section 
explains. 
 
3.2. Amendments of treaty obligations 
 
Like Resolution 1373, Resolution 1540 imposes far-reaching obligations on UN member 
states to enact and enforce a range of measures at the national level, and to co-operate in 
international efforts. Inter alia States must account for and physically protect WMD, develop 
and maintain border controls and ensure law enforcement. The Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT),69 the Chemical Weapons Convention,70 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention71 do not mention non-state actors. After 9/11, however, it was generally accepted 
that there was a ‘gap’ in the existing non-proliferation regime.72 Resolution 1540 sought to 
address this gap by prohibiting states from providing support to non-state actors that attempt 
to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use WMD or their means of 
delivery.73 
 
Not all obligations established by Resolution 1540 were new.74 Like Resolution 1373, it 
imposes on UN member states obligations already enshrined in existing WMD treaties. 
Contrary to Resolution 1373, Resolution 1540 amended the obligations of Parties that had 
already ratified the WMD treaties, which were already in force. But these treaties were not 
intended to deal with ‘terrorism’ or non-state actors and had in any case not been ratified by 
                                                
65 Resolution 1566 (8 October 2004). It was not before 2004 that the Security adopted some guidance as to what 
was meant by ‘terrorism’, but the ambiguity remains. For comments, see A Bianchi, ‘Council’s Anti-Terror 
Resolutions and Their Implementation by Member states: An Overview’ (2006) 4 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 1044, 1050–1051. 
66 Turkey, for instance, referred to it as ‘ground-breaking’; Singapore greeted it as ‘landmark decision’; the 
United Kingdom welcomed it as a ‘historic event’, UN Doc. S/PV.4413 (12 November 2001). 
67 M Wood, ‘Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures: The UN Security Council and International Law - Lecture 
1’ (Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, 7 November 2006) 8. 
68 On the importance of consent in international law-making, see Boyle and Chinkin (n 1) 25. 
69 The 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
70 The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 
71 The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. 
72 See debate in the Council on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction UN Doc. S/PV.4950 (22 April 
2004). 
73 Report of the Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1540 (28 April 2004), UN Doc. S/2006/257, para. 
1. 
74 Cf. M Asada, ‘Security Council Resolution 1540 to Combat WMD Terrorism: Effectiveness and Legitimacy 
in International Legislation’ (2008) 13 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 303. 
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many states.75 In adopting Resolution 1540 the Council filled a gap in the law,76 expanded the 
reach of existing treaties and imposed new obligations on states that had not ratified WMD 
treaties. The Resolution thus created the first comprehensive regime on WMD.  
While Resolution 1540 states that none of the obligations set forth is to be interpreted ‘so as 
to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations’ of state Parties to the WMD treaties, it 
unequivocally imposes new obligations and considerably amends the scope of existing ones. 
Indeed, Resolution 1540 altered international law, both by expanding the obligations of 
Parties to WMD treaties and by creating new obligations for states that had elected not to 
ratify these treaties.77 For these reasons, Resolution 1540 has been described as somewhat 
like an ‘amendment’ to the NPT.78  
Unlike its predecessor, Resolution 1540 was not adopted in response to a specific incident or 
situation, but rather as a response to a generally perceived threat.79 Like Resolution 1373, 
however, the measures imposed were of a general nature, universal in scope and of unlimited 
duration. And like its predecessor, Resolution 1540 is still in force, more than a decade after 
its adoption. 
Resolution 1540, nevertheless, did not enjoy the same warm reception as Resolution 1373. 
India, for example, stated that it would ‘not accept any interpretation of the draft resolution 
that imposes obligations arising from treaties that India has not signed or ratified, consistent 
with the fundamental principles of international law and the law of treaties.’80 Several states 
highlighted that the Council did not have any competence to act as a global legislator.81 Some 
expressed concern that the resolution would impose new obligations, without any direct 
expression of consent from non-Council member states.82 Others worried that the resolution 
would authorise sanctions or other forms of coercion against states that did not adequately 
comply.83 These concerns did not prevent the unanimous adoption of Resolution 1540.84 Its 
lack of perceived legitimacy, nevertheless, has affected implementation, which has been 
described as ‘patchy and somewhat controversial’85 and thus provides important lessons 
concerning the potential to use the Council’s powers in relation to climate change.  
 
 
 
                                                
75 Joyner, ‘Non-Proliferation Law and the United Nations System’ (n 30) 508. 
76 Asada (n 78) 305; E Rosand, ‘The Council as Global Legislator: Ultra Vires or Ultra Innovative’ (2004) 28 
Fordham International Law Journal 542, 551. 
77 G Bunn, ‘The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime and Its History’ in G Bunn, CF Chyba and WJ Perry (eds), 
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Confronting Today’s Threats (Brookings Institution Press 2006) 86. 
78 ibid. 
79 Although it is often linked with the revelation that the Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan had been selling 
nuclear secrets. D Joyner, ‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the UN Security Council in a Mulitipolar World’ in M 
Happold (ed), International Law in a Multipolar World (Routledge 2013) 45. 
80 UN Doc. S/PV.4950 (22 April 2004) 24.  
81  See statements by Pakistan, Algeria, Indonesia, and Iran. For opposite views, see statements by Spain, 
Switzerland and Angola, ibid. 
82 Asada (n 64) 316. 
83 See statements by Algeria, Philippines, Switzerland, Japan, Peru, Cuba, Indonesia and Iran, ibid. 
84 Singapore’s representative probably captured the atmosphere in the Council, when he said that he understood 
‘many of the concerns expressed’ and would have preferred ‘a multilateral treaty regime’, emphasising that 
‘multilateral negotiations could take years, and time is not on our side.’ ibid.  
85 S Lodgaard and B Maerli, Nuclear Proliferation and International Security (Routledge 2007) 279. 
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4. The Council’s enforcement powers in practice 
 
The UN Charter gives the Council the authority to establish such subsidiary bodies as it 
deems necessary for the performance of its functions.86 The establishment of subsidiary 
bodies, such as committees, panel of experts or monitoring groups typically comprising 
representatives from all 15 Council members and operating on the basis of consensus, is not 
uncommon. Over the years the Council has established a variety of so-called ‘enforcement’ 
bodies’87 and all UN sanctions regimes are assisted by one or more of such bodies.88 The 
primary task of subsidiary bodies is to assist in the implementation and enforcement of 
resolutions, which in turn results in UN member states’ obligation to accept and execute 
decisions that these bodies take.89 Resolutions 1373 and 1540 are assisted by dedicated 
enforcement bodies tasked with the review of implementation of state obligations, as well of 
the effectiveness of resolutions themselves. Therefore, although measures envisioned in 
Resolutions 1373 and 1540 ultimately target non-state actors, the onus of implementing these 
obligations rests on states. Accordingly, enforcement measures also focus on states, as this 
section further explains. 
 
4.1. Resolution 1373 
 
The implementation of Resolution 1373 was assisted by an intrusive monitoring system, 
composed of the Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC) and the Counter-Terrorism Committee 
Executive Directorate (CTED).90 The CTC was modelled on the country-specific sanctions 
committees that the Council had established in previous years. The committee was originally 
mandated to monitor the implementation of Resolution 1373. Its mandate was later extended 
to include the facilitation of technical assistance to states and working with international, 
regional, and sub-regional organisations, and the promotion of best practices in the areas 
covered by Resolution 1373.91 The CTED was established in 2004 to assist the CTC and 
represented a clear innovation in the practice of the Council’s enforcement bodies.92 It 
performs a variety of functions, including expert assessment of the implementation of the 
Resolution in domestic legislation, and facilitating counter-terrorism technical assistance to 
individual countries, for instance by means of country visits.  
In the first instance, the CTC required UN member states to enact laws to combat terrorism.93 
Accordingly, states must have legislation in place covering ‘all aspects of Resolution 1373’ 
as well as a process for ratifying ‘as soon as possible’ international conventions and protocol 
                                                
86 UN Charter, Article 29. 
87 Other examples of the establishment subsidiary bodies of the Council are the two international criminal 
tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (Resolution 827, 25 May 1993) and Rwanda (Resolution 955, 8 November 
1994). 
88 This includes committees for Somalia (Resolution 751, 24 April 1992), Iraq (Resolution 1518, 24 November 
2003), The Democratic Republic of the Congo (Resolution 1533, 12 March 2004) and North Korea (Resolution 
1718, 14 October 2006). See Security Council Report, Special Research Report: UN Sanctions (25 November 
2013) 7. Available at: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/>. 
89 Simma and others (n 33) 1929. 
90 The CTED was established by Resolution 1535 (26 March 2004). See generally, E Rosand, ‘Security Council 
Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight Against Terrorism’ (2003) American Journal 
of International Law 333. 
91 Resolution 1377 (12 November 2001). 
92 Security Council Resolution 1536 (26 March 2004). 
93 See ‘stage A’, Work programme of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (28 September - 31 December 2002), 
UN Doc. S/2002/1075 (25 September 2002) 3. 
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relating to terrorism.94 These obligations have arguably made accession to international 
counter-terrorism instruments mandatory, which might explain the sudden surge in 
ratifications after 2001.95 
 
In the second instance, the CTC asked states to enforce the legislation they had adopted, 
including the monitoring of police and intelligence structures, customs, immigration and 
border controls.96 Finally, states were required to partake in bilateral, regional and 
international cooperation, such as the exchange of information or judicial cooperation.97 
 
The work of the CTC and CTED is similar to that of other UN bodies, such as those 
monitoring the implementation of the international human rights treaties. Both sets of bodies 
review reports submitted by UN member states and provide technical assistance to member 
states to enhance their capacity to implement their international obligations, among others by 
developing tools, such as general comments under the human rights regime, or technical 
guides or best practices under the counter-terrorism regime. But whereas human bodies 
generally publicise their observations over state reports, the CTC and CTED are more 
discrete in their approach.98 Another fundamental difference is that reporting obligations in 
human right instruments have a specific treaty basis, whereas reporting obligations under the 
counter-terrorism regime were read into Resolution 1373.99  
 
The results achieved by the enforcement bodies established under Resolution 1373 in 
strengthening global counter-terrorism capacity are mixed.100 In terms of norm setting, the 
results are impressive. Before the adoption of Resolution 1373 only Botswana and the United 
Kingdom had ratified all twelve international counter-terrorism instruments that had been 
negotiated in the previous forty years. Within two years, that number had risen to 40 and 
today most count more than 180 Parties.101  
 
Also in relation to reporting, the initial results were impressive. By 2003 virtually all UN 
member states had submitted their first report to the CTC.102 However, states have since 
shown signs of reporting fatigue and increasingly failed to comply with their reporting 
obligations.103 Lack of compliance could in theory be sanctioned through authorisation of 
measures, such as economic sanctions, or even the use of force, but these drastic 
consequences have never been applied. While the Council initially announced that it would 
                                                
94 ibid. 
95 See Global Survey of the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) by Member states, UN 
Doc. S/2011/463 (2011) 71. See also Resolution 1566 (2004), which called upon all states to become party, as a 
matter of urgency, to the relevant international conventions and protocols. 
96 See ‘stage B’, Work programme of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (1 January-31 March 2003), UN Doc. 
S/2003/72 (17 January 2003) 3. 
97 Report by the Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee on the problems encountered in the implementation 
of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), UN Doc. S/2004/70 (26 January 2004) 10-11. 
98 The reports are available at: <http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/resources/1373.html>. 
99 See ‘stage A’, Work programme of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (n 91) 3. 
100 Cf. D Cortright and others, ‘Global Cooperation Against Terrorism: Evaluating the United Nations Counter-
Terrorism Committee’ in D Cortright and GA Lopez (eds), Uniting Against Terror: Cooperative Nonmilitary 
Responses to the Global Terrorist Threat (MIT Press 2007) 24–30. 
101 See: http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/laws.html 
102 See statement by the Chairman of the CTC to the Security Council, UN Doc. UN Doc. S//PV.4688 (20 
January 2003) 3 and UN Doc. S//PV.4734 (4 April 2003). The three states were Sao Tome and 
Principe, Swaziland and Vanuatu. 
103  Work programme of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (1 October-31 December 2005), UN Doc. 
S/2005/663 (21 October 2005) 3. 
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‘consider what action is needed to address failures to meet the requirements of Resolution 
1373’104 so far it has limited itself to naming-and-shaming states failing to comply with their 
reporting obligations.105 This lack of reaction by the Council’s enforcement bodies is also to 
be viewed in light of the fact that, in spite of dwindling reporting, most states have taken 
steps to criminalise terrorist acts in their domestic laws and regulations, pursuant to their 
obligations.106  
 
4.1. Resolution 1540 
 
Like the CTC, the 1540 Committee107 was tasked with monitoring implementation and to 
coordinate technical assistance for the implementation of Resolution 1540, among others, by 
facilitating expert assistance and organising country visits upon states’ request.108 The 
Committee is composed of representatives from all Council members, which are supported 
by the UN Department of Political Affairs and the UN office of Disarmament Affairs. 
Initially, the Committee was established for a period of two years, but its mandate has 
subsequently been extended several times, most recently until 2021.109  
 
The 1540 Committee reviews UN member states’ reports on steps taken to implement 
Resolution 1540. The Committee has strengthened global non-proliferation and counter-
terrorism regimes, supporting cooperation between international organisations, as well as and 
regional organisations. In 2015, the Committee completed its revision of the record of 
implementation measures of all UN member states.110 Although the results were less 
impressive than those under Resolution 1373, the review revealed that states had generally 
complied with their pervasive reporting requirements under the resolution.111   
 
The 1540 Committee has met challenges similar to those faced by the CTC, including a 
steady decline in state reporting, partly because of reporting fatigue.112 As of 2015, 17 states 
had yet to submit their first report.113 Like the CTC, the 1540 Committee is theoretically 
endowed with powers to redress instances of non-compliance with states’ reporting 
obligations. Still, so far the Committee has never adopted sanctions in cases of non-
compliance. Instead, and similar to the CTC, the 1540 Committee has taken a non-
confrontational approach, engaging in various outreach activities to promote the full 
                                                
104 See statement by the Chairman of the CTC to the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.4512 (15 April 2002). 
105  Cf. Work programme of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (1 July-30 September 2005), UN Doc. 
S/2005/421 (29 June 2005). See also E Rosand, A Millar and J Ipe, ‘The UN Council’s Counterterrorism 
Program: What Lies Ahead?’ International Peace Academy (October 2007) 10. 
106 See Global Survey of the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) (n 95) 14. 
107 Security Council Resolution 1540 (28 April 2004). 
108 The 1540 Committee itself does not provide assistance but has a clearinghouse role to facilitate assistance. 
109 Resolutions 1673 (27 April 2006); 1810 (25 April 2008); 1977 (20 April 2011). 
110 Briefing by the Chair of the Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1540 (22 December 
2015). 
111 In 2011, the Council called upon all states that have not yet done so to submit a first report to the Committee 
without delay. As of December 2015, a total of 176 out 193 members have submitted national implementation 
reports. Review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) for 2015, UN Doc. S/2015/1052 (30 December 
2015). 
112 E Rosand, A Millar and J Ipe, ‘The UN Security Council’s Counterterrorism Program: What Lies Ahead?’ 
(International Peace Academy 2007) 5. 
113 Review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) for 2015 UN Doc. S/2015/1052 (30 December 
2015). 
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implementation of Resolution 1540, and assuming a facilitative role for sharing experiences 
and lessons learned, capacity building and technical assistance.  
 
4.2. Interim conclusion on Council’s practice to date 
 
Resolutions 1373 and 1540 show that the Council may take legislative decisions on matters 
within its mandate to maintain international peace and security. The question is, however, 
what the significance of these resolutions as a precedent is. Resolution 1373 may be regarded 
as somewhat exceptional, because of the circumstances that led to its adoption in an 
atmosphere of general consensus on the need to address what was perceived to be an 
unprecedented threat to security. The same cannot be said of Resolution 1540.114 The 
decreased sense of emergency that characterised the latter resolution may explain some 
states’ reluctance to fully comply with it. In other words, implementation of Resolution 1540 
seems to support the conclusion that the exercise of the Council’s legislative powers is only 
tenable if it is regarded as legitimate by most if not all UN member states.  
 
The Council’s monitoring of the implementation of Resolutions 1373 and 1540 has had some 
notable successes. For example, the CTC has conducted what amounts to the first worldwide 
audit of counter-terrorism capacities, based on the hundreds of reports submitted since 
2001.115  
 
Although it is difficult to determine what role the enforcement mechanisms have played, it is 
a fact that since the adoption of the above-mentioned resolutions many states have taken 
steps to revise existing or adopt new laws and generally enhance compliance with the global 
counter-terrorism and non-proliferation regimes established by the Council. This is despite 
that fact that the Council and its enforcement bodies have been somewhat cautious in the 
exercise of enforcement powers, focusing their efforts on non-coercive measures, such as 
capacity building and promoting the development and dissemination of best practices. But 
while enforcement bodies have been quite successful in securing the adoption of domestic 
legislation, they have not been as successful in ensuring its implementation. As confirmed by 
the CTC itself, many states have ratified international counter-terrorism treaties and 
subsequently failed to adopt adequate enforcement measures, leaving such ratifications with 
little practical effect.116  
 
While some states have made progress in combating terrorist financing, overall efforts have 
been described as ‘uneven’.117 Some have even called the global campaign aimed at freezing 
terrorists’ funds ‘a dismal failure’.118 In some regions, implementation has been influenced 
by changes in national priorities.119 As noted by South Africa’s representative, the Council 
‘should acknowledge that the 1540 reporting requirements themselves were overly 
                                                
114 See address to the UN General Assembly, 7th plenary meeting, UN Doc. A/58/PV.7 (23 September 2003) 
11. 
115 Rosand, Millar and Ipe (n 115) 8. 
116  Ninth Report by the Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee on the problems encountered in the 
implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), UN Doc. S/2004/70 (26 January 2004) 6-7. 
117 M Jakobsen, ‘Combating Terrorist Financing in Europe: Gradual Progress’, Policy Watch/Peace Watch, (26 
March 2007). 
118 P Williams, ‘Warning Indicators and Terrorism Financing’, in Terrorism Financing and state Responses, ed. 
by JK Giraldo and HA Trinkunas (2007) 73. 
119 S Monblatt, ‘Terrorism and Drugs in the Americas: The OAS Response’, Americas Forum: Department of 
Communications and External Relations, IV (March 2004). 
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complicated and not suitable for many developing states’.120 Few African states have been 
willing to devote resources to combating the financing of terrorism.121 In addition, many 
states have progressively become reluctant to comply with their reporting obligations, and 
there is a great deal of variation in the quality and quantity of reporting. Rosand et al. argue 
that the Committee’s reluctance to ensure enforcement may stem from the UN members’ 
general hesitancy to single out other states, and the consensus-based practice under which the 
UN Committees normally operate.122 
 
The lack of enforcement to some extent illustrates the Council’s impotence. As an institution 
without enforcement powers of its own, the Council has to work through states. While in 
theory the Council can order states to take specific action - for instance by enhancing their 
legal and institutional abilities or by criminalising certain forms of conduct - States are 
reluctant to resort to coercive powers in their relations. This section has clearly shown that 
this has been the case even in the context of the Council’s powers under Chapter VII. 
 
It therefore seems possible to conclude that perceived legitimacy is a condicio sine qua non 
for state action through the Council.123 This has been a crucial element in the reduced 
‘compliance pull’ of Resolutions 1373 and 1540 over time.124 Even in cases where the 
Council has exercised its legislative and enforcement powers, the Council has not resorted to 
coercive measures and rather relied upon a ‘managerial’ approach to compliance. 125  
 
5. Applying the Council’s legislative and enforcement powers to climate 
change 
 
While so far the exercise of legislative and enforcement powers has mainly been limited to 
counter-terrorism,126 the Council’s interpretation of a threat to international peace and 
security is open-ended and may well include climate change or its impacts.127 Not unlike the 
proliferation of WMD, climate change poses threats to peace and security which may seem 
less imminent, but which are potentially catastrophic. So far the Council’s debate on climate 
change as a threat to international peace and security has been inconclusive. Yet, the Council 
has already asserted that some of the predicted impacts of climate change, like mass 
migration,128 or the outbreak of disease,129 constitute a threat to international peace and 
security. At the same time, the Council has not used its powers to address more recent 
incidents of mass migration, such as that in Syria, ostensibly for lack of supporting political 
will. 
 
It is nevertheless clear that some of the impacts of climate change may be regarded as threats 
to international peace and security which may benefit from the Council’s intervention. On the 
                                                
120 Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, UN Doc. S/PV.5635 (23 February). 
121 See generally W Okumu and A Botha (eds.), Understanding Terrorism in Africa Building Bridges and 
Overcoming the Gaps (2008). 
122 Rosand, Millar and Ipe (n 115) 10. 
123 As also observed by Scott and Ku (n 21) 11. 
124 TM Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (Oxford University Press 1990) 16.  
125 D Bodansky, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law (Harvard University Press 2011) 236. 
126 See n 34 and corresponding text. 
127 Cf. Scott and Ku (n 21). 
128 Security Council Resolution 688 (5 April 1991) on the repression of the Iraqi population resulting in a flow 
of refugees. 
129 Security Council Resolution 2177 (18 September 2014), in relation to the Ebola virus. 
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one hand, the Council could be involved in the implementation and/or in the enforcement of 
existing international climate change law. On the other, the Council could exercise its 
Chapter VII powers to undertake legislative and enforcement initiatives that complement 
those undertaken under the climate regime. Indeed, during negotiations of the Paris 
Agreement the need to build synergies with other international law and policy forums whose 
mandate overlaps with that of the climate regime was repeatedly flagged. The Paris 
Agreement has broken new ground by tracing explicit links between the climate change and 
the human rights regimes,130 whereas its accompanying COP decision explicitly 
acknowledges the importance of liaising with other international processes on matters such as 
climate finance131 and human displacement.132 In this vein, the exercise of the Council’s 
legislative and enforcement powers would not sideline international law-making and 
enforcement under the climate regime. On the contrary, the Council could work in parallel 
with the climate regime, and support and supplement its implementation and effectiveness.133 
This section explores the exercise of the Council’s powers under Chapter VII in relation to 
climate change, distinguishing between enforcement and legislative powers. 
 
5.1. Legislative powers  
 
As seen in section 3, the Council may exercise its legislative powers in relation to climate 
change, both to impose new obligations upon all UN member states, and to amend existing 
treaty obligations. In theory, the Council could also initiate from scratch law-making 
activities on climate change, regardless of state obligations that are embedded in existing 
international climate change law. The practice of legislative decisions on counter-terrorism 
however shows that the Council has relied on existing treaty law, rather than engaging in a 
law-making process geared towards designing ex novo international law obligations. Even 
setting aside the fact that there is no precedent for this in the practice, it would be hard for the 
Council to engage in such technical law-making activities. International law-making on 
climate change heavily relies on technical input and on the work of the international 
bureaucracy established under the climate regime.134 This bureaucracy could be put to the 
service of the Council, but its technical times and modus operandi would scarcely fit with 
those of the Council, and likely frustrate the purpose to resort to it in the first place. This 
section will therefore only consider action by the Council that fits within the existing practice 
of legislative resolutions. Firstly, it will consider the imposition of new obligations on UN 
member states on the basis of a treaty that has not yet entered into force. Secondly, it will 
analyse the amendment of obligations of parties and the imposition of new obligations on 
non-parties to treaties that are already in force.  
 
5.1.1. The imposition of new obligations 
 
Following the precedent of Resolution 1373, the Council could exercise its legislative powers 
to create new obligations.  
                                                
130 Paris Agreement, Preamble. 
131 Decision 1/CP.21, at 44. 
132 Decision 1/CP.21, at 50. 
133 SV Scott, ‘Implications of Climate Change for the UN Security Council: Mapping the Range of Potential 
Policy Responses’ (2015) 91 International Affairs 1317, 1318. 
134 M Grubb, ‘Full Legal Compliance with the Kyoto Protocol’s First Commitment Period – Some Lessons’ 
[2016] Climate Policy 1. 
 19 
 
First, the Council could require UN member states to ratify the Paris Agreement. Not all 
States have yet done so, and some may prove reluctant. Like the counter-terrorism regime, 
the climate regime requires near universal adhesion to be effective.135 The legislative 
resolutions analysed in section 3 obtained remarkable results by imposing the ratification of 
existing international counter-terrorism treaties on all UN member states.136 The Council 
could similarly act to avert the lengthy ratification process that plagued the Kyoto Protocol 
and its Doha Amendment. It is nevertheless questionable whether the Council should 
interfere with the entry into force of a treaty that has only recently been adopted. Even though 
Resolution 1373 was adopted shortly after 9/11, and less than a year after the Financing 
Convention was opened for signature, this happened in rather exceptional circumstances. 
Unlike the Kyoto Protocol and the Doha Amendment, the Paris Agreement has a much lower 
ratification threshold.137 The Paris Agreement entered into force in November 2016 at what 
has been described as ‘record-breaking’ speed, even though the rule-book for its 
implementation is yet to be written.138 It would therefore seem undesirable to disrupt the 
delicate consensus building exercise that lead to the adoption of the Paris Agreement, 
especially at a time when the elaboration of rules concerning its implementation remains 
ongoing.   
 
Another, more intriguing, use of the Council’s powers to engage with states’ adhesion to the 
Paris Agreement would be to force individual states not to withdraw from it, once they have 
ratified. The Council could for example undertake action to force recalcitrant states to abide 
to their treaty obligation under the climate regime, in spite of withdrawal according to the 
procedures enshrined in the treaties. Canada notoriously withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol, 
before it could be found to be in non-compliance with its obligations.139 The Council could 
act to prevent the recurrence of incidents such as this. This has happened at least once, when 
the Council demanded that North Korea retract its statement of withdrawal from the NPT, 
even though the country had a perfectly legitimate right to withdraw under that treaty.140  
 
Finally, the Council legislative powers could be used to specifically target climate change 
impacts, such as climate-change related disasters and humanitarian emergencies, including 
epidemics, food and water shortages and the displacement of people. Organised migration 
and planned relocation of populations forced to move as a result of climate change have long 
been an elephant in the room at climate negotiations.141 The Paris Agreement does not 
                                                
135 S Barrett, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods (1st edn, Oxford University Press 
2007). 
136 See Global Survey of the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) (n 95) 6. 
137 The entry into force of the Paris Agreement is subjected to ratification by at least 55 Parties to the UNFCCC, 
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comparison, the Kyoto Protocol entered into force only when it was ratified by 55 Parties to the UNFCCC, 
accounting at least for 55 per cent of developed countries’ emissions: Kyoto Protocol, Article 25.1. Before 
entering into force, the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol needs to be ratified by 90 Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol: Kyoto Protocol, Article 20.5. 
138  C Voigt, ‘On the Paris Agreement’s Imminent Entry Into Force’ <http://www.ejiltalk.org/on-the-paris-
agreements-imminent-entry-into-force/> accessed 11 October 2016. 
139 JM Glenn and J Otero, ‘Canada and the Kyoto Protocol: An Aesop Fable’ in Erkki J Hollo, Kati Kulovesi 
and Michael Mehling (eds), Climate Change and the Law (Springer Netherlands 2013). 
140 Security Council Resolution 1718 (14 October 2006) and Security Council Resolution 1874 (12 June 2009). 
For comments, see D Joyner, ‘The Council as a Legal Hegemon’ (2012) 43 Georgetown Journal of International 
Law 225, 248–251. 
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directly address human displacement associated with climate change. Yet, a process to 
develop recommendations for approaches to avert, minimise and address this matter has been 
recently established,142 with existing institutions tasked to facilitate efforts towards the 
development and implementation of comprehensive climate risk management strategies.143  
 
While at the time of writing it is too early to tell whether these initiatives will suffice to 
address the tantalizing task of addressing human displacement associated with climate 
change, it seems fair to assume that the related law-making process will require considerable 
time. In this connection, there could be scope for using the legislative powers of the Security 
Council to support inter-state cooperation. The Council’s legislative powers could be used to 
catalyse action, by imposing upon states to cooperate in the face of massive humanitarian and 
environmental emergencies associated with both rapid and slow onset climate change events. 
For example the Council could force recalcitrant states to take action and/or to cooperate with 
others, through the provision of finance or other resources, or by accepting to take in other 
states’ citizens that have been displaced by climate change. While these contributions would 
go a long way in addressing gaps and limitations in obligations in the climate regime, the 
recent case of Syria provides eloquent evidence of the fact that states may lack the political 
will to use the powers of the Council in this way. 
 
5.1.1. Amendments of treaty obligations  
 
As seen with Resolution 1540, the Council can broaden the scope of existing climate treaties, 
by filling ‘gaps’ in the law or extending the scope of state obligations. The use of the 
Council’s powers could present some advantages. The procedure for amendments to the 
climate treaties is rather lengthy and requires three-fourths majority.144 The Council could 
bypass the hurdles imposed by this procedure, in effect amending the treaties and creating 
new obligations for all UN member states. The exercise of the legislative powers of the 
Council could be targeted at particularly divisive issues, such as amendments to the lists of 
Parties in the Convention’s Annexes. These lists identify which countries are to be 
considered as developed for the purposes of the Convention, with important implications for 
state obligations.145 While the Paris Agreement has considerably levelled state obligations 
when compared with earlier climate treaties, it still hinges on the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities,146 and the degree of differentiation remains to be determined in 
the context of future law-making activities. In this connection, it is possible that the party 
categories identified in the Annexes of the UNFCCC may be of continued relevance,147 and 
require amendment in ways that are more expeditious than those contemplated in the 
UNFCCC. Nevertheless, some of the Council’s permanent members, China and the Russian 
Federation, have historically been reluctant to engage in a re-visitation of the Convention’s 
Annexes. The exercise of Council legislative powers on this issue therefore seems highly 
unlikely. 
 
                                                
142 Decision 1/CP.21, at 50. 
143 Decision 1/CP.21, at 49. 
144 See Paris Agreement, Article 21 and United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article 15.  
145 UNFCCC, Annexes I and II. 
146 Paris Agreement Preamble and Articles 2.2 and 4.4. 
147 As suggested also in: A Savaresi, ‘The Paris Agreement: A Rejoinder’ <http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-paris-
agreement-a-rejoinder/> accessed 20 April 2016. 
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5.2. Enforcement powers  
 
Section 4 has shown that the use of enforcement powers in relation to counter-terrorism has 
largely been geared towards facilitating compliance with the Council’s resolutions and the 
obligations they impose upon UN member states. In this context the Council’s subsidiary 
bodies have performed a managerial, rather than an enforcement role, reviewing reports on 
UN member states’ activities and providing advice on how these may be strengthened, rather 
than adopting enforcement measures, such as sanctions.  
 
Contrary to the counter-terrorism regime, the climate regime is already well equipped with 
tools to enable what has aptly been described as ‘implementation, compliance and 
effectiveness review.’148 International climate change law already establishes reporting 
obligations, both in relation to Parties’ emissions and action undertaken to address these. 
Parties’ obligations in this connection have become increasingly sophisticated and pervasive 
over time. The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol established separate but overlapping 
systems to review the implementation of state obligations. The Protocol is furthermore 
endowed with a compliance mechanism. The Kyoto Protocol Compliance Committee is 
entrusted, inter alia, with reviewing compliance by developed countries’ with emission 
reductions obligations.149 It may even penalise non-compliance, which is unusual by the 
standards of most MEAs.150 The Kyoto Protocol Compliance Committee has performed 
remarkably well,151 raising uncomfortable questions about the adequacy of the overall 
international environmental governance architecture to provide actual solutions to climate 
change. 
 
More generally, the implementation of review arrangements under the UNFCCC and the 
Kyoto Protocol has evidenced a series of shortcomings.152 First, the lack of a standard 
template to report mitigation action under the Convention hindered comparison between 
Parties’ efforts. Second, the review process does not provide means to ‘ratchet up’ ambition 
over time. Third, developing countries have struggled to comply with their increased 
reporting obligations,153 thus drawing attention to the need for dedicated assistance and 
capacity building.  
 
The Paris Agreement builds upon and expands existing review arrangements under the 
UNFCCC, potentially addressing these shortcomings. The agreement imposes upon all 
Parties the obligation to prepare, communicate and maintain successive NDCs and to pursue 
mitigation activities at the national level.154 These obligations of conduct whereby each Party 
is required to submit information on how they intend to reduce their emissions, and by how 
                                                
148 Ibid. 242.  
149 Kyoto Protocol, Annex B.  
150 As argued for example in M Doelle, ‘Compliance and Enforcement in the Climate Change Regime’ in E 
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much, are largely procedural in nature. 155  While no format for (intended) NDCs could be 
agreed ahead of the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the conference of the Parties serving as 
the meeting of the Parties is expected to adopt specific guidance on this issue.156 A Capacity-
building Initiative for Transparency is furthermore expected to support developing countries 
in meeting their enhanced reporting obligations.157 
 
Innovatively, the Paris Agreement has also established the premises for the periodic review 
of Parties’ efforts, both at the individual158 and at the aggregate level,159 which will build on 
and supersede extant arrangements.160 The relationship between this review process and the 
‘expert-based’ ‘facilitative’ ‘non-adversarial’ and ‘non-punitive’ compliance mechanism 
envisioned by the Paris Agreement remains to be ascertained.161 Even though the details of 
this compliance mechanism are yet to be determined, it seems clear that it will follow a 
managerial, rather than an enforcement approach. In other words, as under other MEAs, the 
Paris Agreement’s compliance committee will not so much coerce, but rather encourage 
compliance, enabling Parties’ consultation, cooperation and peer pressure. The very existence 
of a mechanism to consider questions of compliance for all Parties, rather than for developed 
ones only, is a major novelty. However, whether Parties to the Paris Agreement have the 
political will to build a robust compliance framework remains to be seen. With increasingly 
leveled and procedural state obligations, however, it is vital that all Parties are subjected to a 
rigorous scrutiny over implementation and compliance. This could be something in which the 
Council could be of assistance.  
 
If the Council decided to exercise enforcement powers in relation to climate change, it would 
seem superfluous for it to monitor compliance, review implementation, conduct expert 
assessments, or facilitate technical assistance, as similar functions are already performed by 
bodies and processes established under the climate regime. Unlike those under the climate 
regime, however, bodies established under Chapter VII have, at least in principle, 
enforcement powers and can take binding decisions. The practice of the counter-terrorism 
enforcement bodies analysed in section 4 nevertheless clearly shows that so far the Council 
has resorted to measures aimed to encourage, rather than enforce compliance. In theory the 
enforcement powers of the Council could be useful to address perceived shortcomings in the 
functioning of extant review processes under the climate regime. For example, whereas 
developed country Parties have generally complied with their reporting obligations, only few 
developing countries have done so. While this is largely the result of lack of capacity to 
comply with highly technical reporting obligations, the adoption of a specific enforcement 
measures, such as economic sanctions,162 by the Council could encourage negligent states to 
abide to their reporting obligations, and to adhere to the recommendations emerging from the 
review process. It seems, however, unlikely that the Council will decide to use such 
draconian measures to ensure compliance with reporting obligations under the climate 
regime. These measures may even be counterproductive, incentivising states to submit 
                                                
155 As argued also Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement’ (2016) 25:2 Review of 
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reports that are not adequately prepared or overstating their achievements, thus defeating the 
very purpose of the reporting process.  
 
Humanitarian and environmental emergencies provide another and more promising scenario 
for the Council’s enforcement powers, for example in the provision of finance. These issues 
are only partially addressed in the climate regime, which generally requires developed 
country Parties to provide financial assistance to developing ones and to report on 
implementation of such obligations.163 The Paris Agreement has expanded existing reporting 
obligations, by establishing a system to monitor finance, technology transfer and capacity-
building, both provided and received.164 If the Council enforcement powers were to be used, 
it would be a matter of complementing and supplementing extant reporting processes under 
the climate regime, rather than duplicating them. Whether the Council’s enforcement powers 
could meaningfully complement the work of extant review processes under the Paris 
Agreement, however, really depends on how these perform and on the perceived 
shortcomings in their operation. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This chapter investigated the use of the Council’s rather pervasive powers under Chapter VII 
in relation to climate change. It has shown that the use of the Council’s legislative powers 
would present a series of potential advantages in terms of speed, universality and coherence. 
In terms of speed, the Council is unrivalled. The Council can if necessary act in days. This is 
the result of the extraordinary nature of its powers, which can be exercised when the Council 
determines the existence of a threat to international peace and security. These characteristics 
in turn suggest that the use of legislative powers by the Council in relation to climate change 
ought to be reserved to exceptional circumstances, which cannot be addressed through 
ordinary enforcement and law-making processes. Council action also has clear advantages in 
terms of universality. Any resolution on climate change adopted by the Council would be 
binding on all UN member states. This would be of particular significance if the Paris 
Agreement does not attract wider ratification than is required for entry into force. Finally, the 
Council has much to offer also in terms of coherence. Decisions adopted under Chapter VII 
have the added benefit of taking precedence over other international obligations and therefore 
do not have to conform to existing international law. Council law-making could thus enhance 
the coherence of international action to address climate change, if used appropriately.  
 
As far as enforcement is concerned, the Council’s subsidiary bodies have been rather 
effective in facilitating the adoption of legislation by UN member states, even though their 
track record in ensuring implementation has been at best mixed. At least in theory, these 
bodies can apply sanctions to states failing to comply with their requirements, something that 
the climate regime cannot do. Yet in practice Council enforcement bodies have not used their 
powers in this way. They have rather opted for a facilitative approach to compliance, which is 
largely similar to that performed by existing treaty bodies under the climate regime. 
 
The use of the Council’s powers, however, remains problematic. The Council’s exercise of 
legislative competence leaves much to be desired in terms of accountability, participation, 
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procedural fairness, and transparency of decision-making.165 If the Council took on the role 
as global legislator on climate change, the vast majority of states would in effect be excluded 
from the law-making process. The contrast with the consensus-based law-making process 
established under the climate regime could not be starker. The perceived lack of legitimacy of 
the Council as a climate change lawmaker could therefore be a serious hindrance, especially 
vis-à-vis the existence of an international forum specifically dedicated to this purpose – the 
climate regime –, which has gained adhesion from virtually all states in the world. 
 
A blanket exercise of the Council’s legislative powers in relation to climate change would be 
especially problematic. At the substantive level, international climate change law-making 
entails a high level of technicality that the Council is scarcely equipped to deliver. In this 
connection, resort to the existing law-making processes under the climate regime is more 
dependable. At the formal level, resort to Chapter VII powers would evade national control 
over the process of treaty ratification and may on that basis be regarded as illegitimate. For 
all these reasons, a blanket use of Chapter VII powers by the Council in relation to climate 
change is unlikely. 
 
More realistically, this chapter has suggested that the Council’s powers could be used to 
support the implementation of existing international obligations concerning climate change. 
The exercise of the Council’s powers would furthermore be especially useful in instances 
where urgent action is required to maintain or restore peace and security, as a result of the 
impacts of climate change. This may be the case in relation to incidents that require fast 
coordination of state action, for example in relation to disaster and humanitarian relief. When 
such incidents occur, the Council’s involvement would not only be possible but indeed 
desirable to tackle egregious emergencies, which other law-making and enforcement 
processes are ill-equipped to address. 
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